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ABSTRACT 
In the years since the introduction of liberalizing market reforms in China and India, both countries 
have experienced rapid and sustained economic growth even as they have struggled with a 
simultaneous surge in economic and social inequality. This working paper traces the evolution of the 
post-reform growth in inequality and demonstrates the pervasive influence of location in 
determining and entrenching a spatial pattern to the deepening divides in each country. Though the 
centrality of location serves as a common link between China and India, the unique reform 
experiences of each country have led to distinct outcomes. Specifically, the paper illustrates how in 
China the spatial pattern of inequality stems from the divide between the interior western provinces 
and the rapidly growing coastal provinces, whereas in India the disparity is more apparent between 
urban and rural areas.  
The analysis outlines how policy choices in agriculture, hard infrastructure, soft infrastructure, 
migration and industry have affected income inequality and how these inequalities have manifested. 
In China, the export-led growth strategy employed after market-reforms has allowed the country to 
capitalize on its expansive coastline, resulting in a rapid rise in disparity between coastal and interior 
provinces coupled with rapid economic growth. Similarly, in India a booming service sector in the 
post-liberalization era allowed for a disproportionate increase in the importance and growth of 
urban centers at the expense of rural areas. While location alone cannot explain the post-reform 
experience of China and India, geographical factors underlie many of the forces which have driven 
the disparity.   
While this analysis is inherently context-specific and requires nuanced enquiry on a local level, the 
implications of this discussion are global in scope. The paper concludes with several questions which 
require a more inclusive exploration. Does the Chinese case provide evidence that regional 
inequalities, particularly those that result from geographical factors, are a necessary evil of growth 
and globalization? What lessons can India take from the growth experience of other nations, and in 
turn, what lessons can it provide? These questions, and others, may serve as the basis for a larger, 


















In 2011 the world witnessed mass popular uprisings on an unprecedented scale. In the Middle East 
and North Africa citizens took to the streets in protest of what they saw as decades of inequality at 
the hands of authoritarian regimes. Dictators who had ruled with an iron fist for decades were 
toppled and the world stood by and hailed the coming of democracy in a region marred by years of 
conflict and pervasive inequity. In the US, thousands of the self-proclaimed “99%” took to public 
spaces across the country to give voice to what they saw as America’s failure to address the growing 
income inequality and uneven wealth distribution between the top-earning 1% and the rest of the 
population. In India, the discussion about inequality centered on questions of corruption as social 
activist Anna Hazare led a popular movement that demanded accountability at all levels of 
government. And in Europe, where the state has historically been an active player in providing vital 
social services, citizens protested tough austerity measures, enacted in the wake of the recent debt 
crisis, that promise to widen social inequalities throughout the continent. Protests over economic 
and social inequality have spread rapidly through cities across Europe, North America, the Middle 
East, Asia and Latin America making it increasingly clear that inequality, in whatever form it takes, is 
not an isolated problem, but rather an issue of immense global concern. 
 
In this paper, we explore the progression of inequality in post-reform China and India by focusing on 
changes in various sectors of the economy, hard infrastructure, soft infrastructure, and income 
distribution in each country. In the cases of China and India, we highlight the particular importance 
of location in understanding existing patterns of inequality and the shape of trends in inequality 
since the advent of reforms in the two countries – 1978 in China and 1991 in India. 
 
While China and India are similar in several respects, they have each followed distinct paths to 
growth and development in the past 60 years. Both countries became independent around the same 
time – India in 1947 and China in 1949; both are continental size economies with billion plus 
populations and geographically part of the Asian continent; pre-reform China and pre-reform India 
were both characterized by more or less similar levels of economic development and state planning, 
and were predominantly agrarian societies; both have witnessed high levels of economic growth in 
their respective post-reform periods, though China has grown much faster and for a longer stretch of 
time. And hence both are now called emerging economies. 
 
On the other hand, China and India have also had significantly different political and economic 
histories. Most significantly, while China is governed by single party authoritarian rule, India is a 
multi-party democracy. While the Indian Constitution provides for free speech, press and an 
independent judiciary, these ideals and institutions do not exist in China. India's growth has differed 
from China's in its reliance on domestic demand and growth in services rather than export-oriented 
labor-intensive manufacturing production as has been the case in China. While China became a huge 
success in attracting foreign direct investment and in creating tens of millions of job opportunities to 
enable it to become a major platform for manufacturing, India on the other hand failed on this front 
due largely to its half-hearted attempts. Going forward, given the demographic transition in the two 
countries, India's workforce will increase by 110 million over the current decade while China's will 
increase by less than 20 million.  
  
Inequality in China and India prior to market reforms 
From the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 through to the introduction of market 
reforms in 1978, the "pre-reform era," China experienced relatively low and steady levels of 
inequality, discounting spikes introduced by the effects of the Great Leap Forward and the Great 
Famine (1960) and the Cultural Revolution (1976). The communist "pre-reform era" was 
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characterized by a central planning system under which the national government retained strict 
control over the allocation and utilization of financial revenues with the goal of achieving broad-
scale equity of distribution1. Periods of inequality did occur - during the Great Famine a series of 
natural disasters coupled with gross mismanagement of resources on the part of the state resulted 
in millions of rural deaths and sharp increases in rural-urban inequality. Similarly, during the Cultural 
Revolution, a lack of incentives in the agricultural sector and a strong bias towards heavy industry 
led to a China's second pre-reform peak in inequality.  However, while inequality did exist in the pre-
reform era, central planning was largely successful in keeping income levels in China at a relatively 
equitable level and the country did not see a steady rise in income inequality until after the initiation 
of market reforms in 1978. 
 
It is interesting to note, however, that despite relatively low levels of inequality in the pre-reform 
era, several policy choices made during that period, namely the center's concentration of heavy 
industry investment in the north-eastern coastal provinces, have had a significant impact on the rise 
of regional inequality during the reform period and onwards. The effects of these policies will be 
explored in greater detail in later sections.  
 
Recognizing the need for a substantial change in the direction of the economy following the 
devastation wrought by the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese leadership introduced the first set of 
market reforms in 1978, starting with a renewed focus on agriculture. As the following sections will 
illustrate, the rise in income inequality in China has been shaped primarily through the effects of 
three prominent forces: a heavy industry bias pursued prior to reform and later shift to a labor-
intensive, export-oriented manufacturing strategy; the decentralization of fiscal and decision making 
powers in the post-reform era; and the opening of the Chinese economy to external trade and 
investment. The effects of these forces have been profoundly location-specific and lead us to 
explore the extent to which geography has played a role in determining inequality in China.  
 
In 1991, India introduced its market reforms and began the process of liberalization amidst a very 
different economic and political context. Upon achieving independence in 1947, India adopted a 
Constitution in 1949, the Preamble of which stated India would be a “Sovereign, Socialist, Secular 
Democratic Republic”  that featured  a mixed economy model wherein both the public and private 
sectors had a role to play. Over the course of the next 41 years, this structure would lead to the 
creation of a large, bureaucratic state that exerted tight controls on trade and private enterprise. Of 
course, attempts were made in 1966 and in 1985 to liberalize certain sectors of the economy, but 
they did not lead to any significant liberalization of the economy. Even as neighbouring countries, 
such as Japan, South Korea, and China experienced periods of rapid growth, the Indian economy 
inched along at a meagre 3.5% average GDP growth rate until the mid-1980s. Although 
considerations of social and economic equity played a large part in the initial decision to adopt a 
socialist model, data from the pre-reform period shows extremely poor indicators for poverty and 
inequality. 
 
By the mid-1980s, as the effects of India’s restrictive economic structure and policies continued to 
hinder the attainment of higher GDP growth and rapid economic development, the government 
                                                          
1
 While the central planning system managed to keep inequality levels relatively low, it did so largely at the 
expense of efficiency. Under agricultural collectivization, the system of income distribution in the communes 
provided little work incentive and contributed to a decline in worker productivity. Studies show that the 
productivity of "private plots" during collectivization was often five to seven times that of collective land. 
During this period, surplus from agriculture was redirected towards industrial production meaning that no 
additional capital was invested into improving the productivity of agricultural land. Regional comparative 
advantage was all but ignored in favour of local self-sufficiency in grain production in support of the rapid 
industrialization push (Wu 1997).  
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started to introduce a modest program of reforms. However these measures were very limited in 
scope (Bajpai, 1996). Meanwhile, heavy governmental borrowing between 1985 and 1990, though 
leading to a boost in GDP growth rate, also caused external debt to rise from 12% to 23%.  
 
Government efforts to mitigate the growing imbalance in the country’s balance of payments that 
began in the mid-1980s led to a fiscal and balance of payments crisis in 1990-1991. The government 
reached near bankruptcy in that year as it struggled to cope with severely depleted foreign reserves. 
In response to the crisis, the then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, as part of Prime Minister P.V. 
Narasimha Rao’s government, led a program  of economic policy reform for macroeconomic 
stabilization and opening up of the Indian economy  to attain and sustain higher rates of GDP 
growth. While the program still called for gradual change, it ultimately spurred a much wider range 
of reforms that served to liberalize the Indian economy. Regulations on industry and trade were 
drastically reduced, and the financial sector was reformed to become much more encouraging of 
private sector growth. During the crisis period, GDP growth fell to a low of 0.8% while gross fiscal 
deficit of the government reached 10% of GDP and inflation peaked at 17% (Bajpai, 1996). The 
government’s strategy served to stabilize these numbers in the short term, and the structural 
adjustments allowed for much higher annual GDP growth in subsequent years. However these 
positive changes have also led to significant concerns regarding the worsening state of social and 
economic inequality in India in the decades since liberalization. In particular, the locational patterns 
of growth and development have led to questions regarding the importance of urbanization as an 
engine of Indian growth and the extent to which such growth can be inclusive in a country with a 
majority rural population. 
 
In this paper, we focus on understanding the size and shape of inequality in various  sectors in China 
and India, and then attempt to synthesize these findings in the context of  changes in the post-
reform era in each country. Section II explores inequalities within the agriculture, industrial, and 
service sectors, hard and soft infrastructure, and income distribution in China. Section III goes 
through a parallel analysis for India. Section IV explains how a locational pattern of growth has 
served to deepen an equivalent pattern of inequality among the aforementioned sectors, 
highlighting the importance of geography in thinking about strategies for inclusive growth in China 




Agriculture, Industry & Services  
The agriculture and industrial sectors, and to a much lesser degree the service sector, were at the 
crux of the market reforms introduced in China in 1978 in response to declining economic growth  
rates witnessed in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. Each has played a critical role in shaping 
patterns of income inequality across the country and their reform experiences have been significant 
in that role.  
 
Agricultural reforms were introduced as part of the first package of policy changes in the early 
reform period, beginning in 1978. The commune system2, once the pillar of the Chinese agricultural 
                                                          
2
 Under the communist collectivist system, the commune was a political and economic organization that 
undertook most local government functions, ranging from the administration and operation of schools and 
hospitals to justice and police. Communes also controlled all economic activities, including assigning state 
production plans and procurement quotas to production brigades and teams, promoting new technologies, 
and mobilizing massive amounts of labor to construct agricultural infrastructure. Under the commune system, 
agricultural output was sold under a rationing scheme to urban consumers and industries at subsidized prices. 
As a result, a large agricultural surplus was transferred from agricultural producers to urban consumers and 
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system, was replaced by the "Household Production Responsibility System (HPRS) in which individual 
households leased land from the collectives guaranteeing more equitable access to land for 
individual farmers and improving production incentives. In addition to contributing to high rates of 
agricultural growth during the early reform period,  the introduction of HPRS, and the corresponding 
boost in agricultural efficiency, allowed non-agricultural rural industries, known as Township and 
Village Enterprises (TVEs), to expand, absorbing a large part of farm labour. That this shift in 
employment from farm labour towards newly developed non-agricultural industry occurred within 
the rural economy, rather than prompting migration from rural to urban areas, represents a unique 
element of China's reform experience (OECD, 2005). TVEs provided a framework for investing new 
agricultural surpluses back into the rural economy and played a critical role in the export-led growth 
of the post-reform economy. In 2000, TVEs accounted for 47% of total industrial output and 48% of 
the country's total exports (Fu & Balasubramanyam, 2003), indicating the extent to which 
agricultural reforms not only had an impact in raising agricultural production and absorbing the 
resultant surpluses in rural industry,  but also contributed to China's overall post-reform economic 
take-off.   
 
A central feature of China's economic reforms have been the devolution of administrative and fiscal 
decision making powers from the center to local governments. A new fiscal structure was put in 
place in which local governments were granted more autonomy in allocating resources towards 
priority sectors. While allowing local governments greater incentive to promote economic growth, 
due to historical differences in economic development, as well as inherent geographical factors, the 
impact of decentralization has differed among provinces.  Consequently, decentralization has 
become an influential factor in the rise in regional inequality in the post-reform era (Kanbur and 
Zhang, 2005). 
 
As a result of fiscal decentralization, regions with a diverse economic structure and a larger revenue 
base have had a greater degree of freedom with which to finance economic development. 
Conversely, those provinces with a historically agrarian economy have had to rely more heavily on 
the extraction of levies, hindering economic growth (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005). This effect has been 
felt primarily in the non-coastal provinces which have had few other avenues for economic 
expansion outside of agriculture.  
 
Nevertheless, agriculture has played a major role in the growth of the aggregate economy, which 
has seen real GDP growth average above 9% from 1990 through 2010 and even more rapid growth 
in trade and investment (World Bank, 2010). Following agrarian reforms the agriculture sector has 
expanded rapidly, at a rate of 4.6% per year since 1978 (in contrast to a growth rate of 2.5% in 
India), despite a declining share of overall employment from 1993 onwards (Bosworth and Collins, 
2007).  
 
The industrial sector (composed of the mining, manufacturing, construction and public utility 
industries) has been similarly significant for the Chinese economy. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
have consistently contributed to approximately half of the country's GDP, due in part to a historical 
bias towards heavy industry which lay the foundation for China's rise as a powerhouse of labor 
intensive, export-oriented manufacturing, and a history of state-sponsored industrial production 
(Bosworth and Collins, 2007). In order to promote industrialization after the initial period of land 
reform in 1952, the Chinese state extracted massive resources from agriculture through the 
suppression of agricultural prices and restrictions on labor mobility. Heavy industry received the 
majority of scarce investment funds - in place of light industry, agriculture and the service sector - up 
until the reform period, with industrial centers in the north-eastern coastal provinces of Manchuria 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
industries. Under collectivization, nearly 120 million farm households were forced onto approximately 24,000 
communes in rural China, each containing around 5,000 households (Wu 1997).  
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benefiting at the expense of the country's rural economy (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005). Early 
industrialization in the north-eastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning, set the stage for 
these three, traditionally rich provinces, to capitalize on the industrial reforms introduced as part of 
the larger packet of market reforms in the early 1980s, and solidify their standing as the industrial 
heartland of China. However, it was the coastal provinces of Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan that experienced the fastest GDP growth in the post-reform era, with 
their expansive coastlines and natural ports allowing them to take advantage of the export-oriented 
nature of industrial reforms (Demurger et. al., 2002). 
 
FIGURE 1. Map of China divided by costal and interior provinces  
 
 
Industrial reform was initiated in China as a result of dissatisfaction with the country's economic 
performance on the part of party leaders. With the aim of boosting industrial performance to the 
level of China's East Asian neighbours, the central government began to tackle a series of problems 
and opportunities within the sector with ad hoc policy responses throughout the 1980s. The 1990s, 
however, brought consensus in Beijing that a decentralized market economy would be the target 
outcome of economic reforms (Rawski, 1994).  
China's initial industrial reforms, aimed at promoting an export-led growth strategy, have focussed 
primarily on creating an enabling environment for industrial initiative by removing existing barriers 
for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These reforms, introduced in 1980, allowed SOEs to retain a 
share of their profits rather than handing them over to the state, introduced a bonus system that 
sought to improve worker productivity, and ensured room for SOEs to procure their own inputs and 
produce and sell goods outside of the plan, after fulfilling specific production and financial targets. 
Goods produced outside of the plan were permitted to be sold in what were predominately free 
markets (Rawski, 1994). The industrial sector grew rapidly between 1978-1983, with large increases 
in employment and total factor productivity improvement (Bosworth and Collins, 2007).  While 
industrial reform allowed SOEs to continue to operate in the new market economy, the impact of 
industrial reform was felt mainly in the non-state sector. The growth of the non-state sector in the 
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post reform-era served to largely offset the inevitable losses incurred by state-owned enterprises as 
the economy transitioned.  
 
Tsui argues that the industrial sector has exerted the predominant influence on interprovincial 
inequality in China. The historic preference for heavy industry emphasized under the central 
planning system has created a weighty bias towards industrial provinces which received sustained 
investment in the pre-reform era and were most well situated to take advantage of industrial 
reforms. While the relative factor weight of the secondary sector on inequality began to decrease in 
the years leading up to 1984, when industrial reforms were introduced, Tsui asserts that the 
declining trend can be explained by the reorientation of the industrial sector from the production of 
heavy industrial goods to light industry. An upturn in the relative factor weight of the industrial 
sector can be seen in 1984, explained by the introduction of the package of urban industrial reform 
detailed above which allowed the richer coastal provinces, with more developed non-state industrial 
sectors controlled by the local governments, to boom in the post-reform period. The industrial 
reform packages, aimed at encouraging an export-oriented growth strategy, gave non-state 
enterprises significant freedom to expand in the second half of the 1980s and onwards, allowing for 
the rapid proliferation of labor-intensive manufacturing in the richer, coastal provinces (Tsui, 1996).  
In 1980, the Chinese leadership realized that the key to attaining high rates of growth depended on 
achieving high export growth which in turn depended on diversifying away from traditional sectors, 
especially raw materials, into non-traditional sectors, especially labour intensive manufactured 
goods.  However, China lacked the technology by itself to be competitive in manufactured goods.  
Therefore, it invited in foreign direct investors to provide the capital and the expertise to achieve 
export competitiveness in a wide range of sectors, including electronics, apparel, plastic toys, stuffed 
animals, ceramics, and many other labour-intensive sectors.   
 
In each sector, the key was to link foreign investor capital and expertise with a large and low-cost 
Chinese labor force.  The foreign investors brought in the product design, specialized machine tools 
and capital goods, key intermediate products, and knowledge of world marketing channels.  The 
Chinese government assured these foreign investors certain key conditions for profitability, such as 
low taxes, reliable infrastructure, physical security, adequate power, decent logistics for the import 
and export of goods, and so forth. At the center of China’s export strategy were the special 
economic zones (SEZs) in which favourable export conditions were assured. 
 
Accordingly, China implemented an ambitious export-oriented growth strategy, the central feature 
of which was the establishment of SEZs and Open Coastal Cities.  This was done essentially to 
develop China into a major platform for labor intensive manufacturing production. Between 1978 
(when the Open Door policy was implemented) and 2010, it grew from the thirty-second largest 
trading nation in the world to the second, with the most dramatic growth being in labor intensive 
manufacturing production where it had a distinct comparative advantage.  This trade liberalization 
has been accompanied by spectacular growth in GDP and foreign trade.  The SEZ and Open Cities 
have grown rapidly from fairly small backward areas to thriving modern industrial cities.   
 
The first four SEZs, set up in 1980, were Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong Province, and 
Xiamen in Fujian Province.  They were chosen specifically because of their geographical proximity to 
the major regional world trading centers of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. The understanding was 
that this proximity would make it easier to attract foreign direct investment and would make it 
attractive for firms to shift parts of their production bases (particularly those which are labor or land 
intensive as both labor and land are more scarce and expensive abroad) to mainland China.  Also, it 
was to be a geographically isolated (and therefore controlled) experiment with market oriented 
policies. 
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Given the successes achieved in attracting foreign direct investment; creating large scale 
employment opportunities and in boosting exports, the scope of the SEZs has expanded 
considerably since their inception and except for Shenzhen, their territories have been increased.  
Additional provinces have been opened to foreign direct investment and the demarcation between 
so-called open areas and the rest of China have become less sharp.  In 1984 fourteen coastal towns 
were opened up to form Open Coastal Zones and in 1988 the island of Hainan received full provincial 
status and was officially declared the fifth SEZ.  The Chinese leadership also decided to open up the 
entire coastal region from Liaoning province in the north to Guangxi province in the south.  In 1990 
the most ambitious of the economic development zones, Pudong New Area (in Shanghai) was 
opened.  In early 1992 preferential policies were also extended to cities in inland provinces, 
especially those along the Yangtze river. Statistics bear testimony to the fact that coastal provinces, 
with the help of SEZs, became the engine of China’s growth and while the interior provinces grew 
rapidly too, they were no match for the runaway growth witnessed in the coastal provinces for a 
period of almost three decades since 1980. 
 
Unlike industry, China's service sector played a minimal role in the pre-reform era, during which it 
was artificially suppressed in keeping with the "Stalinist mode of industrial development," yet it has 
begun to play an increasingly more important role in the post-reform Chinese economy. The service 
sector expanded at an average annual growth rate of over 9% during the 1990s, accompanied by 
rapid income growth, and has increased its share of employment from 13.1% in 1980 to 28.7% in 
2010. The increase comes mainly from the primary sector, which has seen its share of total 
employment fall from 68.7% in 1980 to 36.7% in 2010 (Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 2010a). An 
investigation of provincial level data illustrates that the bulk of the growth of the service sector can 
be attributed to the richer, and more urbanized, coastal provinces.  Employment share in the service 
sector in 2010 was below 40% in most provinces only exceeding 50% in Beijing (74.1%) and Shanghai 
(58.5%) (China Statistical Yearbook, 2010a). As the Chinese economy continues to grow and income 
levels continue to rise the importance of the service sector will naturally increase, perpetuating 
existing disparities in regional inequality.    
 
The sustained importance of industry to the Chinese economy, coupled with the slow rise of the 
service sector and the declining employment share in agriculture, have had a profound effect on 
inequality in China. As income levels have risen in the coastal provinces which are best suited to take 
advantage of export-led growth, and decentralization has further weakened the ability of the inland 
agrarian provinces to finance economic expansion, China has had  to contend with the fact that 
market reforms have led to unequal levels of growth across the country. In considering growth, 
which is contingent on having the necessary infrastructure to support economic activity, we must 
then ask what the effects of reform have been on the development of hard infrastructure in order to 
analyze the ease by which the different sectors have been able to flourish in particular regions. 
 
Hard Infrastructure 
The rapid development of hard infrastructure has been a central component of the growth story 
experienced by China in the reform era. The transport, water, and energy sectors have experienced 
substantial expansion in the last three decades; by 2009 90% of China’s population had access to 
clean drinking water, 99% had access to electricity and the road network had reached a density of 40 
km per 100 sq of land area (World Bank, 2010). Similarly, by 2009 China’s energy generation 
exceeded 3.6 million gigawatt hours, making China the second largest energy producer in the world3 
(World Bank, 2010).  
                                                          
3
 China's rapid expansion of energy production has come about primarily through the operation of coal-fired 
power plants, resulting in an equally rapid increase in the country's CO2 emissions. In 2011 China's averaged 
per capita CO2 emissions of 7.2 tonnes, making China the world's leading emitter from fossil fuel use (Olivier 
et.al, 2012).  
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As was the experience with other sectors, the centralized decision-making structure of the pre-
reform era meant that public investments for infrastructure development were made according to 
priorities established by the central government's general development strategy. Prior to reform, a 
preference for heavy industry development, and from 1960 onwards, self-sufficiency, proved 
particularly influential for infrastructure growth, most notably in the transport sector. Emphasis on 
heavy industry concentrated transportation network investments in north-eastern China, where the 
majority of heavy industry was located (Demurger, 2001). Conversely, the lack of infrastructural 
development in other regions, coupled with a lack of investment in industry, led to an unfavourable 
environment for growth and perpetuated the cycle of inequality.  The infrastructural investments 
made by the state in the heavy industry centers of the northeast prior to 1978 laid the foundation 
for the labor-intensive manufacturing sector to flourish in post-reform China. That those 
investments were concentrated in the eastern provinces compounded the inherent inequity of the 
export-led, costal based growth strategy.  
 
Despite the emphasis on infrastructural development in the pre-reform era, infrastructure 
investments in that period were inadequate to meet the needs of the country. While a priority 
investment program, initiated in the early 1980s, named the energy and infrastructure sectors as key 
areas of focus and financial allocation, investment in transport, telecommunications, and energy 
continued to lag behind that of industry for the subsequent decade, with the share of investment 
remaining constant at 10% and 20% of state fixed-asset investments respectively. However 
infrastructure became increasingly prioritized from the start of the 1990s, bringing the share of 
transportation and telecommunication services in state fixed-assets investment to 30% in 1998 
(Demurger, 2001). However, by 2010 the share of state fixed-asset investment in transportation and 
communications infrastructure (including investments in IT infrastructure) had dropped back to 
approximately 11% (China Statistical Yearbook, 2010b).   
 
The experience of the infrastructure sector in the post-reform economy closely resembled that of 
the previous sectors discussed, with the decentralization process playing a considerable role in the 
inequitable development of infrastructure among the different provinces. While fiscal 
decentralization has allowed local governments more flexibility in allocating  funds towards fixed 
asset investment, many provinces have neglected their roles as providers of public goods in order to 
concentrate attention and funds towards economically productive activities. As such, 
decentralization had the effect of reinforcing pre-existing inequalities, as the capacity to raise funds 
for infrastructural development has depended heavily on local government revenues, which are 
significantly greater in provinces which have historically had a larger infrastructural capacity and 
thus a larger industrial revenue base (Demurger, 2001).  
 
A costal/interior divide appears sharply when one considers transport network density, which 
declines rapidly the further into the interior one goes. The disparity is particularly evident in the road 
network, which was developed primarily in the past twenty years, illustrating the uneven 
development of infrastructure between the coastal and interior provinces throughout the reform 
era. Even among non-coastal provinces, those that are relatively well equipped with transportation 
facilities are located on the periphery of the coastal provinces and boast either significant energy 
resources (e.g. the province of Shanxi, which is a major coal producer) or easy access to the Yangtze 
River (e.g. Hubei and Anhui). However several provinces with extensive energy resources - such as 
Nigxia, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang - which are considerably more remote, and do not border a 
coastal province, lack any significant transport infrastructure (Demurger, 2001).  
 
This argument is support by a study conducted by Banerjee, Duflo and Qian that found that regions 
located closer to historical transportation networks – such as railroads – exhibited a higher GDP per 
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capita, higher amount of industrial activity, and higher profits from industry.  The study goes on to 
assert that these same regions also exhibit higher levels of income inequality. Banerjee, Duflo and 
Qian argue that higher inequality in the better connected regions results from a situation where 
capital mobility is lower than the mobility of goods and capital movement flows from less connected 
areas towards better connected areas (Banerjee, Duflo and Qian, 2012).   
 
An even more noteworthy regional divide is evident in the distribution of telecommunications 
infrastructure, which reinforces the disparity in transport infrastructure and the underlying focus on 
developing infrastructural capacity in historically industry-heavy provinces during the pre-reform 
period. The three northern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, all state-owned industry 
bases prior to the reforms, led in the distribution of telecommunications facilities (Demurger, 2001).   
Infrastructural deficits in the western provinces have played a self-perpetuating role in regional 
inequality and underlie the importance that fiscal decentralization has played in increasing 
disparities in the post-reform period. Without the requisite infrastructure to support growth in 
economic activity, the interior provinces have lagged behind the coast in attracting the foreign direct 
investment that has bolstered coastal China's boom. Yet without a sufficient economic base, local 
governments in the interior provinces have lacked adequate funds to invest in infrastructural 
expansion, furthering regional inequality.  
 
As we have demonstrated thus far, market reforms have led to uneven levels of growth throughout 
the country. The Chinese economic growth story has been characterized by a preference for export-
oriented industry along the coast, leading to lower levels of investment in hard infrastructure, and 
subsequently lower income growth, in provinces that lacked a geographical advantage. The situation 
was further compounded by a fiscal decentralization scheme which deepened the disadvantages of 
the poorer and more remote western provinces. How then have social sectors faired as a result of 
reform?    
 
Soft Infrastructure (Health and Education)  
Fiscal reform has had a profound effect on both the health and education sectors in China, limiting 
the redistributive power of the central government and imposing tight budget constraints on local 
governments. While prior to reform the central government managed strict control of all healthcare 
services across the country, organizing a three-tier system - which included China's famous "barefoot 
doctors" - that resulted in a rapid advance in the health status of the country, the decentralization of 
financial responsibility for managing healthcare to the provincial level led to a growing exacerbation 
of health disparities between rich and poor regions (Dong and Phillips, 2008). 
 
As a result of decentralization, regions with limited resources were forced to make cuts in social 
sector spending and pass responsibility for healthcare expenses to individual households (Zhang and 
Kanbur, 2005). The share of public spending on healthcare declined from 84% of total health 
expenditure to 39% between 1980 and 2001. Conversely, out-of-pocket expenditure as a share of 
total health expenditure rose from 16% in 1980, the year after market reforms were initiated, to 
61% in 2001 (Zhang and Kanbur, 2005). Though total per capita expenditure on health, which 
includes both public and out-of-pocket spending, rose from $44 USD in 2000 to $221 USD in 2010 
(World Bank, 2010), indicating larger investments in healthcare overall, the shift in the source of 
financing during the initial twenty years after reform left many unable to meet the burden of rising 
out-of-pocket expenditure and resulted in systemic changes which further accelerated the rising 
trend of inequality in post-reform China. Though public expenditure rates have subsequently 
increased, reaching 54% of total health expenditure in 20104 (World Bank, 2010), health care 
                                                          
4
 At the same time, out-of-pocket expenditure as a share of total health expenditure has declined from 61% in 
2001 to 37% in 2010 (World Bank, 2010).  
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resources remain unevenly distributed with most rural areas lacking health facilities able to provide 
even the most basic of care.  
China has realized impressive gains in education, achieving nearly universal enrolment in primary 
education by the early 1960s, and witnessing growth in the adult literacy rate from 60% in 1960 to 
94.3% in 2010 (UNESCO, 2010). Yet despite these gains, studies show that there is a widening 
disparity in access to, and quality of, basic education within and among Chinese provinces, stratifying 
those who have benefited from the rapid economic growth of the reform period and those who h 
have not. The declining share of government expenditure on education, and the subsequent 
variation in the amount of local resources targeted for education, has led primarily to disparities in 
capital construction, teacher salaries, and the quantity and quality of teaching facilities and materials 
(Qian and Smyth, 2008). 
 
Data from the late 1990s and early 2000s show the richer, and more urbanized, coastal provinces 
meeting benchmarks for the mandated nine years of universal primary education and percentage of 
primary school students continuing to secondary school. In western provinces, however nearly 1 in 
10 primary school graduates fail to progress to secondary school, with the failure rate closer to 21% 
in Guizhou and 45% in Tibet. Research suggests that the highest provincial primary education 
expenditure per student (Shanghai) is ten times that of the lowest. As regional disparities for 
education funding increase, and with non-budgeted funding becoming increasingly tied to economic 
performance, disparities in educational performance are likely to grow (Hannum and Wang, 2006).  
 
The uneven economic growth among provinces and the decline in state investment in hard 
infrastructure development and social services as a result of fiscal reforms has all played a role in the 
rise in income inequality in China in the post-reform era. As the sections above illustrate, the effects 
of reform have been particularly significant when location is considered. The coastal regions have 
surged ahead, taking advantage of historic and geographic advantages, leaving the interior regions 
to suffer the consequences of a pullback in the central government's redistributive powers. Taking 
into account the rising out-of-pocket costs that result from a decline in social sector spending an 
inquiry into inequality in China must naturally turn to questions of income distribution. How have 
income levels been affected by the trends we have explored? Does the divide between coastal and 
inland provinces persist when taking in to account inequality in income? What factors have been the 
most significant in explaining the widening gap in income inequality in the post-reform era?  
 
Income  
Income inequality in China was relatively low in the pre-reform era, despite peaks brought about by 
the effects of the Great Leap Forward and the Great Famine in 1960 and the Cultural Revolution in 
1976. It was not until the start of economic reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s and after 1983 
in particular when the process of fiscal decentralization began and China began to open its economy 
to external trade and foreign direct investment, that the country saw a steady and consistent rise in 
income inequality (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005).  
 
According to GINI coefficient data, income inequality in China was 16% higher in 2000 than it was in 
1960, far exceeding the spikes brought about by the Great Famine and Cultural Revolution. 
Inequality appears to have been at its lowest when policy was encouraging the agricultural and rural 
sectors and highest when these sectors have been neglected (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005). 
 
Kanbur and Zhang have argued that the evolution of income inequality in China can be traced by the 
progression of distinct political and economic periods in Chinese history, specifically the heavy 
industry development strategy of the pre-reform period and the subsequent export-led industrial 
growth strategy of the post-reform era, and the decentralization and opening of the Chinese 
economy in the 1980s and 1990s (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005). As such, China has seen a widening gap 
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in regional income inequality in the past decade as the effects of decentralization and the open 
economy take root. Table 1 below shows the distribution of per capita incomes for the top six and 
bottom six provinces over a thirty year time span. Coastal provinces exhibit the highest per capita 
incomes, while the bottom six provinces, all with per capita incomes significantly lower than the 
national average, are located in the western interior. 
 
TABLE 1. GDP per capita (Yuan) in China by Province  
 
Province 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Shanghai 2737.0 6107.0 29671.0 76074.0 
Beijing 1544.0 4635.0 24122.0 75943.0 
Tianjin 1358.0 3487.0 17353.0 72994.0 
Jiangsu 541.0 2109.0 11765.0 52840.0 
Zhejiang 471.0 2138.0 13416.0 51711.0 
Guangdong  481.0 2484.0 12736.0 44736.0 
Shaanxi 334.0 1241.0 4968.0 27133.0 
Qinghai 473.0 1558.0 5138.0 24115.0 
Tibet 471.0 1276.0 4572.0 17027.0 
Gansu 388.0 1099.0 4129.0 16113.0 
Yunnan 267.0 1224.0 4769.0 15752.0 
Guizhou 219.0 810.0 2759.0 13119.0 
National Average 463.3 1644.0 7857.0 29991.8 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2010 
 
Wan and Zhou explain that when provinces are ranked in terms of per capita income, as shown in 
Table 1, the rankings do not tend to shift significantly from year to year, particularly when looking at 
the top and bottom performers. This, they argue, suggests that little convergence of income levels 
has taken place despite the Chinese economic success story of the past two decades at both national 
and regional levels.  
 
Using household-level survey data, Wan and Zhou decompose inequality to determine what factors 
have played the most significant role in the widening gap in income inequality in China among 
coastal and non-coastal provinces. Given that income gaps across geographical regions were 
relatively small in the mid-1980s but have expanded rapidly from the mid-1990s onwards, 
geographical location alone cannot be considered as the sole driver of the increasing disparity. Using 
data from three provinces; Guangdong, a rich province located on the south-eastern coast; Hubei, a 
middle-income province in central China; and Yunannan, a poor province in the western region; a 
regression-based decomposition of household level data was conducted. The results show that 
geography plays a fairly constant role in total inequality over time, reflecting the intractability of 
locational factors. However, as total inequality has been increasing over time, the percentage 
contribution of geography displays a decreasing trend. Conversely, the share of capital input in a 
region shows an increasing role in total inequality. While contributing a meagre 2-4% in the 1990s, 
the contribution of capital input to total inequality has risen to 16-24% in the past decade (Wan and 
Zhou, 2005). These findings are consistent with our analysis in the sections above which detail the 
significant impact that fiscal decentralization has had on the availability of capital in the historically 
poorer provinces of western China which must now rely on a narrowing agrarian revenue base to 
stimulate economic activity in the absence of the required investments from the central 
government. 
 
As our analysis in this section has shown, the rise in income inequality in China can be traced to 
three, location-specific, factors brought about by the market reforms introduced in 1978: the heavy-
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industry bias prior to reform and later the shift to labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing; 
fiscal decentralization; and the opening of the economy to external trade and investment, which will 
be explored in more detail in section IV. While geographical factors alone cannot explain the 
increase in inequality, the experience of each of these reform trends has been significantly affected 




 Agriculture, Industry & Services 
The development of agriculture, a historically dynamic as well as volatile component of the Indian 
economy, and the primary source of employment for the majority of the 69% rural population today, 
provides an interesting starting point for understanding the changing shape of India’s economy in 
the post-reform era. Throughout even a large part of the 20th century, India has had to cope with 
threats of absolute food grain shortages, famines, and failure to import enough and distribute 
effectively. As a result, agricultural planning after independence in 1947 largely focused on 
increasing production and attaining self-sufficiency. This effort, aided in large part by the Green 
Revolution, succeeded in making India self-sufficient in food grains by the end of the 1970s, and a 
major exporter by the turn of the 21st century (Mujumdar, 2006). 
 
While agriculture has clearly come a long way in the past half century, data shows that the advances 
in agriculture have long since begun to falter. The momentum created by the Green Revolution 
began to slow after the 1970s, dampening the scope and intensity of its improvements, and 
agriculture became fully crippled by the effects of the economic reforms launched in response to the 
crisis in 1991. Mujumdar (2006) calls the 1990s a “lost decade for agriculture” (p. 32). Indeed there is 
a consensus among most economists that the agricultural sector was largely ignored during the 
process of liberalization, causing a sharp decrease in the rate of growth of the sector and leading to 
what the Indian Government has characterized as an “agrarian crisis” (Ministry of Finance, 13). The 
annual growth rate of agriculture, which had been 2-4% during most of the period after 
independence, dropped down to an average of just 0.6% between 1994-95 and 2004-05 (Krishna & 
Bajpai, 2011, p. 47). This decline, set against the backdrop of a booming economy led by rapid 
service-sector growth, has accelerated the downward slide of agriculture’s share in GDP; data from 
the Central Statistical Organization (CSO) indicates that the 29.5% share of agriculture in 1990-1991 
has diminished to just 13.9% in 2011-2012 (Planning Commission, 2012.) 
 
While the declining importance of agriculture is a familiar feature of a developing economy, its 
particular importance in India, a nation where well over 50% of the population still relies on the 
sector for employment and income, renders this fall particularly devastating. In fact, even as 
agriculture has stagnated over the past two decades for reasons including inefficient distribution of 
land, inadequate access to finance, and a lack of recent technological advances, the share of 
agriculture in employment, according to CSO data, has only slightly decreased, remaining within the 
50-60% window (Ministry of Finance, 2007, p. 15). This has created a situation of saturation in 
agriculture, as evidenced by a non-agriculture to agriculture worker productivity ratio that was 
already over 4 at the time of reforms and had grown to over 5 by 2005-06 (Ministry of Finance, 
2007, p. 15). Many rural families, in an effort to supplement increasingly meagre agricultural 
incomes, have been forced to turn to other industries. With inadequate alternate employment in 
rural areas, much of this supplemental income has had to come from towns and cities. The data 
indicates that the share of agriculture in rural incomes has decreased by over 25% in the period 
between 1993-94 and 2004-05 (Krishna and Bajpai, 2011). 
 
As the primary occupation of an 833 million strong rural India, agriculture is a key indicator of India’s 
growth and development. Yet the Indian economy has been booming with a rapid GDP growth rate 
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in the post-reform era, a success story that has been largely shaped by an ever growing service 
sector. In sharp contrast to the stagnation of agriculture in the post-reform era, the service sector, 
which typically employs more highly educated urban-dwellers, has boomed and allowed for these 
sections of the population to see great growth and success. 
 
Interestingly in India, the manufacturing sector, which has historically come to dominate primarily 
agricultural economies as a country develops, has remained extremely small and has seen very 
limited growth even in the more encouraging atmosphere of the post-reform years. Indeed it could 
have been this economic vacuum, created by a stagnating agricultural sector and a non-starter in 
manufacturing, which left the service sector to dominate the economy and grow. In any case, this 
bifurcated economic structure is illuminating in the way that it institutionalizes a cleavage between 
those with the opportunity to join the service-led boom and those that are relegated to agricultural-
stagnation, and thus creates a major pattern of Indian inequality in its image. 
 
Hard Infrastructure 
Given that a crisis in balance of payments brought on the economic reforms of the 1990s, efforts to 
reduce the government deficit, which had been averaging 7% (and 10% plus when combined with 
state deficits) in the years leading up to the crisis, became central to achieving macroeconomic 
stability. Specifically, revenue expenditure was extremely high at the time of the crisis when 
compared with revenue receipts. Moreover, revenue expenditure had continued to impose an 
increasing burden on the deficit even in the decade after reforms (Bajpai, 1996). The need for fiscal 
consolidation in the aftermath of the reforms therefore required a cut in capital expenditure, which 
involved rollbacks in spending on physical and social infrastructure (Pal & Ghosh, 2007). Targets for 
investment in hard infrastructure items like roads, power lines, and water resources, as well as soft 
infrastructure areas, like health and education, were reduced. And in reality, spending in these areas 
indeed fell short of even these reduced budget allocations (Chandrasekhar & Ghosh, 2002). 
 
It is important to note the role of state governments when assessing targets and achievements in 
building infrastructure. In the Indian system, states hold much responsibility for planning and 
financing development in both hard and soft infrastructure. As a result, the impact of liberalization 
on states and their budgets is also highly relevant in the development of infrastructure. For the most 
part, the first decade of liberalization had the effect of tightening state resources available for 
spending on physical and social infrastructure. However for high growth states, which were 
inevitably the ones which housed the centers of the booming service-sector industry and to a lesser 
extent manufacturing, there was much more fiscal space to budget for such investment (Pal & 
Ghosh, 2007). This administrative feature of the system served to further entrench geographic 
inequalities between regions of high service-sector growth and those without by tying the fates of 
growth and physical development. 
 
Data from the post-reform period show that despite a tightened state and central budget and the 
adverse effect this had on public investment, there was a marked expansion in hard infrastructure 
indicators. Looking at rural infrastructure even in the first post-reform decade between 1991 and 
2001, there was an overall increase from 68% to 76% in the proportion of villages that received 
electricity and an increase from 42% to 64% in villages connected by paved roads. When 
disaggregated, however, this data shows that for indicators representing road connectivity, power, 
irrigation, and telecommunications, there is a marked downward trend as distance from the nearest 
city or town is increased. This means that there has been a disproportionate emphasis on rural areas 
located closer to urban areas. This trend is directly relevant to the spatial pattern of inequality that 
emerged from the discussion on agriculture and services; while rural dwellers located in villages near 
cities and towns are directly enabled to supplement agricultural income with work in urban areas 
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those in villages located farther away remain dependent solely on agriculture (Krishna & Bajpai, 
2011). 
 
The turn of the century brought the beginning of a new phase in the post-reform economy. A decade 
into the post-reform era, the pattern of drastically increasing inequality, clearly presented by the 
poor lot of large swathes of rural India, had become apparent. Additionally, an exploding growth 
rate had increased government resources and capacity to intervene. The decade brought on an era 
of renewed government spending on large-scale development programs.  
 
Bharat Nirman, a flagship program launched in 2005 by the government, was intended to represent 
a holistic approach towards building rural infrastructure for development. It consists of projects 
targeting water supply, roads, housing, telecommunications connectivity, electricity, and irrigation 
throughout India. The program, currently in its second phase, was slated to receive Rs. 480 billion or 
4% of total government expenditure in 2010-2011. While success has been tempered with significant 
shortcomings and inefficiencies in several areas, the program has managed considerable success in 
meetings its goals for telecommunications and drinking water supply increases (Lalvani, 2010). 
 
Soft Infrastructure 
While the impact on hard infrastructure in the 1990s rollbacks in government expenditure was 
somewhat ambivalent, the effect on government spending for soft infrastructure target areas, 
notably health and education, was one of more decided neglect. Amidst a long-standing trend of low 
rates of government expenditure on health and education, the reductions brought on after 
liberalization exacerbated existing patterns of poor social indicators, particularly among the poorer 
sections of the population. 
 
Despite India’s limited successes since independence in improving an extremely poor health and 
nutrition status, it still shows some of the worst indicators in the world in these two areas. According 
to World Bank data, even today 53% of Indian children are undernourished and up to 88% of 
pregnant women are burdened with anaemia. For other indicators, there are huge regional 
disparities within India; for instance UNDP data from 2011 shows a life expectancy of 74 in Kerala as 
opposed to only 58 in Madhya Pradesh. These poor and incredibly disparate health and nutrition 
conditions are thought to stem from the structure in which they are planned and financed within the 
government system. Firstly, public spending on health in India is extremely low by international 
standards compared to its income level. Moreover, the dramatic increases in GDP growth in the last 
two decades have also highlighted that health spending seems to be relatively inelastic to growth in 
India. Center and state health spending together amounted to only about 1% of GDP throughout the 
period between 1996-97 and 2005-06. Despite concerted efforts to focus on health in more recent 
years, this proportion had only risen to 1.2% in 2009-10 (Tandon & Cashin, 2010). Secondly, planning 
and financing health initiatives is predominantly the responsibility of the states, and inter-state 
differentials in GDP serve to limit certain states’ capacity for improving health while differentials in 
priorities, based on cultural factors, serve to create very heterogeneous health conditions 
throughout the country. Overall, in the years since reforms, there has been a decline in states’ social 
spending overall, as well as a related drop in health spending, while central government spending 
simply remained stagnant during this period. There has also been an increasing gap between the 
spending of richer and more social-sector oriented states and others. For instance, in 2008-2009, 
Bihar’s public spending on health was under half that in Kerala and Tamil Nadu (Berman & Ahuja, 
2008).  
 
In 2005, the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) was launched by the Department of Health and 
Family Welfare in order to mitigate the negative health and nutrition effects on a rural population 
that was more vulnerable to disease and less able to pay for care. Programs such as the NRHM, the 
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Janani Suraksha Yojana, for mothers, and the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), an insurance 
program for the poor, aim to improve access and affordability of health care for the poor. Given the 
current challenges inherent in the health prevention and care system, particularly the low levels of 
federal and state government spending, the vast majority of spending on health comes out of pocket 
and on private providers. In light of the huge burden this places on primarily poor families, the 
NRHM and RSBY aim to bring some relief particularly to the rural poor, although they have been 
implemented with mixed success. 
 
Education has had much better success in the post-reform years than health, though wide disparities 
in availability and quality of educational resources have persisted. Literacy rates have been steadily 
increasing from about 43% in 1981 to 52% in 1991 and 65% in 2001. Such aggregate data hides the 
many differentials that exist between groups. For instance, the gap between male and female 
literacy rates is closing all too slowly, and regional disparities in literacy rates can be quite high. The 
state with the lowest literacy rate, Bihar, has literacy rates that are about 18% below the national 
average, while Kerala has an average literacy rate of around 90.92% (Pal & Ghosh, 2007, 16). 
 




Primary school enrolment again shows a steadily increasing trend, but one that is all too slow. With 
shortfalls in essential resources like buildings, blackboards, toilets, and textbooks, and a high 
frequency of teacher absenteeism, there is a reluctance to enrol and a high rate of drop outs. This 
has resulted in a large number of 6-14 year olds being out of school. (Pal & Ghosh, 2007, 17). 
 
In education, as in health, there has been a surge in private sector involvement, with a large number 
of private schools often offering a much higher quality of education. This has been met with a 
parallel decline in the share of government schools offering education at the primary and secondary 
school levels. The vast majority of these private schools are located in urban areas (Pal & Ghosh, 
2007). This trend in education has again fostered a structure that compounds the challenge of 
including rural populations in growth. In recognition of the poor quality of many rural schools and 
the complete lack of schools in some areas, the government launched Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan in 
2000. While the program fell far short of its goal of universal primary education by 2010, it did 
increase enrolment rates and promote retention in many states, especially among girls (Das, 2007). 
 
Income 
The post-reform era brought a marked increase in income inequality across India. The trend can be 
observed by looking at the Gini coefficient based on aggregate, all-India data: it was 0.337 in 1983, 
0.347 in 1993-94, and 0.376 in 2004-05. Income inequality can, in a sense, be viewed as both a cause 
for, and a consequence of disparities in opportunity caused by the inequitable distribution of 
growing industries and employment, hard physical infrastructure, and soft social infrastructure. 
Viewed in this way, the data seriously questions the overall extent to which growth has been 
inclusive in India.  India recorded one of the fastest recoveries from a fiscal and balance of payments 
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crisis and the growth achieved in the post-crisis period was more sustainable than the growth in the 
immediate pre-crisis period. Overall economic growth of GDP at factor cost, after rising to 6.3% in 
1994-95, accelerated further to 7% in 1995-96. The second half of the 1990s and the first decade of 
the 21st century saw India sustaining high rates of economic growth before being pulled down as a 
result of a combination of factors - internal deficiencies and the global downturn. However,  even as 
the top income quintile within urban areas were able to see an average annual growth of 5% in wage 
rate, the data shows that over half of the Indian population was stagnant if not declining during this 
period (Sarkar & Mehta, 2009). 
 
In the pre-reform period, although there was a wide differential between the richest and poorest 
income groups and no strong evidence for convergence, the pervading economic structure imposed 
limits on growth that also effectively resulted in a cap on the magnitude of the divide. In the high 
growth post-reform India, however, the easily quantifiable increases in income inequality illustrate 
the deepening need for inclusive growth. Even in the second decade after reforms, a comparison of 
the per capita state domestic products of the top 6 and bottom 6 states shows the widening divide. 
 
TABLE 3. Per Capita Net State Domestic Product at Current Prices 
 
State 2000-2001 2010-2011 
Haryana 25583 94680 
Maharashtra 22777 83471 
Sikkim 16077 81159 
Gujarat 18392 75115 
Tamil Nadu 20972 72993 
Kerala 20094 71434 
Madhya Pradesh 11862 32222 
Assam 12803 30569 
Jharkhand 10345 29786 
Manipur 12369 29684 
Uttar Pradesh 9828 26355 
Bihar 6415 20708 
 
Source: Government of India, Planning Commission Data 
 
Unlike in China, where the top states are distinguished by heavy manufacturing and exporting 
enabled by proximity to the coast, the top states in India are predominantly characterized by 
significant levels of urbanization, often even led by the remarkable success of one or two major 
cities. It is indicative that the top two states in the chart above are home to India’s two largest cities 
– Gurgaon (part of Delhi’s National Capital Region) in Haryana and Mumbai in Maharashtra. In fact 

















FIGURE 2. Comparing Indian States: GDP vs. Urbanization 
 
Source: India’s urban awakening: Building Inclusive cities, sustaining economic growth 
 
Sarkar and Mehta (2009) have shown that in the post-reform decade, the bottom two income 
quintiles in rural India saw only a 1% increase in income while the middle quintile remained 
stagnant. In urban areas, they show that the growth of the wage rate among regular workers was 
negative up to the 50th percentile. But in both urban and rural areas, the top quintile saw much 
higher increases, averaging around 5% per annum. 
 
Krishna and Bajpai (2011) have analysed the data for trends among various quintiles in rural areas 
for an even more recent period, between 1993 and 2005. Their findings have made a strong case for 
the importance of proximity to urban centers among the rural population. Using distance from the 
nearest town or city as a variable, they have found that rural indicators for villages located less than 
5 kilometres from the nearest town or city are significantly better than for those that are further off. 
In fact, in these “umbra” villages, as they have called them, they have shown that all income groups 
increased in purchasing power in the post-reform era, although the top quintile benefited the most 
with 20% growth. Data from villages that are located more than 5 kilometres away from the nearest 
city or town, on the other hand, depicts a much different story in these areas in the period of 
economic liberalization. Their findings have shown that among this population, every quintile except 
for the topmost has experienced a real loss in wages during the period 1993-2005. And they have 
found that the bottom-most quintile has experienced a drastic 15% decline in real income over the 
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LOCATION AS A DEFINING FACTOR 
 
China 
As was explored in section II, inequality in China can largely be characterized by a costal-interior 
divide. While the basis of this stratification was sewn in the pre-reform era, during which the 
center's heavy industry development strategy prioritized investment in urban industrial centers 
along the coast which then became the most favourably situated to adapt to the post-reform, 
export-oriented push, economic reforms have  led to further perpetuation of regional disparities.  
 
In order to promote rapid integration into world markets in the 1980s and onwards, China 
implemented a coastal-biased development policy, making it difficult for the inland provinces to take 
advantage of the benefits of an open and decentralized economy. Several policy choices favoured 
costal development including: (1) an increased rate of state investment; (2) higher tax breaks for 
exports, higher foreign exchange retention rates and lower tariffs on imports for coastal provinces; 
(3) increased provincial autonomy due to decentralization; and (4) favourable policies for attracting 
labor, capital and raw materials from the interior (Wei, 1998). As the opening discussion on China 
illustrates, the effect of these policies, compounded by the tightened budgets faced by local 
governments in the wake of fiscal decentralization, created a situation in which the interior 
provinces were unable to compete with those along the coast.  
 
As a result of favourable policies, in addition to their inherent geographical advantages, coastal 
provinces have attracted the majority of FDI and have generated higher trade volumes than inland 
provinces. In 2000, three coastal provinces - Guangdong, Juangsu, and Shanghai - attracted the 
highest FDI while three inland provinces - Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, and Jilin - attracted the least. 
The same top three provinces alone contributed to more than 60% of total foreign trade in 2000 
(Kanbur and Zhang, 2005).  
 
The impact of openness on the coastal-inland disparity has been significant. In 1978, the coastal 
province of Guangdong ranked 14th in labor productivity compared to a ranking of 15th for Sichuan, 
an interior province. In China's closed economy, Guangdong did not enjoy a significantly better 
resource endowment than Sichuan, leading to comparable rates of economic growth. However with 
the opening of China's economy, Guangdong's proximity to Hong Kong  made it a favoured location 
for FDI while Sichuan declined from 15th in labor productivity to 23rd in 2000 (Kanbur and Zhang, 
2005).  
 
In addition to their geographical advantages, coastal provinces have been granted several 
advantages such as the creation of strategically placed SEZs (such as in Guangdong and Fuijan, the 
sites of the first two SEZs to be established) and development zones which offer generous incentives 
to foreign investors. Coupled with a historical economic advantage, coastal provinces have been 
successful in parlaying these benefits into spectacular rates of economic growth (Tsui, 1996) by 
following an export-led growth strategy.  
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FIGURE 3. Special Economic Zones of the People's Republic of China 
 
 
Research shows that geography contributed to 40% of total inequality in 2002, 15% lower than its 
share in 1995 (Wan and Zhou, 2005), indicating that although location is declining in importance it 
continues to play a substantial role in determining inequality. Kanbur and Zhang argue that though 
the share of the inland-coastal disparity is declining in regards to total inequality, it has contributed 
dramatically to the changes in inequality that have occurred as the Chinese economy has opened up 
(Kanbur and Zhang, 2005).  Coastal and inland regions started with relatively similar urban-rural 
relative incomes in 1985, but by 2000 the urban-rural income differential became much higher 
inland than on the coast. Within urban areas, costal-inland relative incomes grew from 1.25 in 1985 
to 1.42 in 2000. In rural areas the differential grew from 1.27 in 1985 to 1.67 in 2000 (Lin, Wang and 
Zhao, 2004).  
 
The costal-inland disparity can easily be considered the defining factor of income inequality in China. 
Inherent geographical advantages have been compounded by decades of costal-biased development 
and the uneven impacts of market reforms, resulting in a situation in which coastal China has surged 
far ahead of the rest of the country. China's restrictive migration regulations have intensified the 
effects of these regional disparities and have impeded income convergence in unique ways. The 
following two sections touch upon the effects of China's migration policies and attempts to correct 
the costal-inland divide.  
 
Migration 
In order to support a preference for heavy industry and accelerate the pace of industrialization in 
the early 1950s, the central government established the Hokou5 system of household registration, 
restricting people to the village or city of their birth in order to ensure that there was sufficient 
agricultural labor to produce the necessary amount of grain for urban industrial workers (Kanbur and 
                                                          
5
 The 1958 "Regulation on the Registration of Households," which formed the legal basis for the Hokou system, 
required every household to register its place of residence and to gain permission for any change in residence. 
Official permissions for change in residence were strictly limited. Migration without permission was extremely 
difficult from 1958 through the early 1980s. Food provisions were strictly rationed and allotments were made 
according to one's official residence. As such, migrating without official permission jeopardized a household's 
source of food. Additionally, children of illegal migrants were denied access to government schools, and other 
services provided in urban areas were made unavailable to unregistered migrants (Jian, Sachs and Warner, 
1996).  
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Zhang, 2005). As labor mobility is a key component in the convergence of income levels, the 
limitations put on migration in China in the pre-reform era serve as an important determinant for 
income inequality (Jian, Sachs and Warner, 1996).  
 
With the adoption of reforms in 1978, food and lodging have become available on a market basis 
making unregistered migration considerably easier. Though constraints remain and illegal migrants 
continue to be denied access to schooling, state-run healthcare and other urban services, informal 
migration increased significantly in the 1980s and 1990s, with an estimated 100-150 million people 
migrating in the mid-1990s (Jian, Sachs and Warner, 1996). From 1979 to 2010, permanent urban 
population increased by 474 million due to the massive influx of rural migrants (World Bank, 2010). 
However, while urban migrant workers typically earn more than three times the average income per 
capita of most rural farmers, less than 10% receive the social security and medical insurance granted 
to over two-thirds of permanent urban residents. 14-20 million children of migrant workers lack 
access to education, in addition to vaccination coverage and routine health services. Many migrant 
workers, subjected to working conditions in which health hazards are high, are forced to move back 
to rural areas in order to receive medical care (Ha, Yi, and Zhang, 2009).  
 
Thus while the easing of migration restrictions have alleviated some of the pressure on costal-inland 
inequality by allowing workers from the interior to migrate to more economically productive urban 
areas along the coast, it has also contributed to a rise in urban inequality. Further relaxation of 
migration restrictions, as well as other corrective policy measures, will be needed in order to reduce 
the widening costal-interior divide. The Western China Initiative, inaugurated by the central 
government in 1999, is such an attempt. 
 
Western China Initiative  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Chinese government followed a concerted strategy to first 
develop the eastern and southern coastal regions, in order to boost the country's overall growth, 
before turning attention to the western and central provinces. Birthed out of the "Xi'an Speech" 
given by Jian Zemin on 17 June 1999, the Western China Initiative (WCI) was aimed at compensating 
the interior provinces for their "patience" during decades of coastal-focused policies and reversing 
perceived exploitation of the interior provinces by the coast (Lai, 2002). While the initiative stated 
numerous priorities, from the construction of infrastructure to economic and sectoral adjustments 
targeted towards the interior's comparative advantages and improving living standards, in reality the 
program was geared mainly towards four key areas: the construction or upgrading of hard 
infrastructure, the creation of a more favourable policy environment for investment, building a 
skilled labor force, and maintaining the region's ecological soundness (Lai, 2002).  
 
The change in China's regional development policy to include the western regions seemed to suggest 
that not only would the state redirect resources for the western provinces, but that there would be a 
higher degree of state intervention in the economic development of the region than had 
characterized the reform era up to that point. However the experience of the Western China 
Initiative has in fact seen little redirection of state resources towards the interior and investment has 
been limited to specific projects for which funding had already been identified prior to the start of 
the initiative. The lack of resources has been matched by a lack of coherent or consistent policy 
statements detailing the initiative, leading to the belief that the Western China Initiative emerged 
from a collection of parallel and sometimes competing agendas aimed at hastily rectifying decades 
of inequitable development, rather than from a purposeful policy strategy (Goodman, 2004).  
 
Nonetheless, the GDP per capita of provinces covered by the Western China Initiative grew more 
rapidly after the initiation of the program, with the average annual growth rate of real GDP per 
capital rising to 13.26% in the period from 2001-2010 from 6.6% between 1991-2000 (Lu and Deng, 
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2011). The increases in GDP can mainly be attributed to the optimization of the economic structure 
of Western China as a result of additional investment in critical infrastructure, with the primary 
sector declining in its share of economic output and the region witnessing critical growth in  
industrial output (both in mining and manufacturing). In 2000, the value-added share of industry in 
the interior as part of the national total was only 13.7%; by 2010 it had risen to 21.4% (Lu and Deng, 
2011). The shift in the orientation of the economy of Western China holds consistent to the pattern 
of economic development experienced by not only the rest of China but the majority of developed 
countries and demonstrates the necessity of continued intervention by the state in the development 
of the historically overlooked western provinces.  
 
While studies show that the standard of living has improved in both urban and rural areas of the 
western provinces, WCI has done little to address inequalities in social services like health and 
education that have perpetuated in the West as a result of decentralization. In addition, 
interregional inequality has grown within Western China, with inequality measures based on real 
GDP per capita of western regions rising from 0.031 in 2000 to 0.065 in 2010. Similarly, urban-rural 
income disparities are much higher than those on the national level, although the trend is similar  
(Lu and Deng, 2011). It has yet to be determined what the impact of the Western China Initiative has 
been on reducing overall regional inequality or if it will prove to be a successful counterpoint to 
China's coastal focussed, export-led growth strategy  
 
India 
Krishna and Bajpai (2011) have said, “Globalisation-driven economic growth in a country whose 
population remains largely rural has [had] spatial effects on the distribution of benefits” (p. 44). 
Given recent trends in the shape of the economy, in hard and soft infrastructure, and ultimately, in 
income inequality, a clear spatial pattern indeed does seem to emerge in terms of the opportunity 
that is provided and the success that has been attained among various parts of the population. 
Specifically, the discussion above points toward a divide between urban and rural India. 
 
This pattern is established by the opening discussion outlining the various sectors of the economy. 
Agriculture and its allied industries form the cornerstone of the economy and employment in rural 
areas. And yet investments in agriculture, which can be led by discovering and spreading innovative 
new technologies on the one hand and developing rural infrastructure to irrigate more land on the 
other, have been lacking. As saturated agricultural opportunities run dry, more and more rural 
dwellers have been forced to seek supplementary employment. This supplementary income has 
been disproportionately located in urban areas, mainly due to the fact that only the service sector, 
which is concentrated in urban areas, has been growing and providing increasingly diverse avenues 
for employment. Interestingly, the manufacturing sector in India never took off in the way it should 
have. While the easing of regulations and encouragement of the private sector spurred huge growth 
in services, manufacturing remained limited. Boosting the manufacturing sector could be an option, 
and indeed remains a highly recommended objective, for directing labour in need of employment 
(Bajpai and Sachs, 2011). 
 
The lack of sufficient income generating opportunities explains one root cause of the pattern of the 
urban-rural income inequality observed in the data above. A key feature of this pattern in inequality 
is that the urban-rural divide seems to manifest as a continuum, where direct benefits increase with 
proximity to a city or town from a range beginning up to 5 kilometres away (Krishna & Bajpai, 2011, 
48). This spatial pattern is supported by the analysis on hard infrastructure, which indicates that 
everything from irrigation to road and telephone connectivity in rural areas improve with proximity 
to urban areas. In an economy which has rendered agricultural opportunities weak and largely 
insufficient to support the rural population, those living closer to cities can have better irrigated 
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farms to glean more off of their agriculture, and are also better connected to potentially seek their 
supplemental income in urban centers, where economic opportunities are far greater. 
 
In a study that covered 10 years of pre-reform India and almost a similar period of post-reform India, 
growth rates of GSDP per capita were found to be highly correlated with the extent of urbanization 
to start with (Sachs, Bajpai & Ramiah, 2001.) In a regression of growth of the states during 1980-
1998 on their initial incomes in 1980 and urbanization as of 1981, the urbanization coefficient turned 
out to be highly significant.  The regression results also show that a 10-percentage point higher rate 
of urbanization is associated with 1.3 percentage points of higher annual growth.  As much as 82% of 
the cross-state variation in growth is explained only by the differentials in level of "urbanization". 
The strong influence of urbanization is confirmed also when the regression is run without initial 
income as an explanatory variable. This strong historical trend is also expected to persist in the 
coming decades. 
 
FIGURE 3. Projected increase in population and incomes in rural areas located near cities 
 
Source: India’s urban awakening: Building Inclusive cities, sustaining economic growth 
 
The dynamics of social infrastructure again seem to build on the existing pattern. Poor water 
supplies and drainage systems in faraway villages contribute to disease. And yet improved health 
care facilities, including access to private facilities, are more readily available in urban centers, 
benefitting those with better connectivity. Similarly the barrier to entry into the booming service 
sector is education, which has been more heavily invested in areas with greater proximity to urban 
centers. 
 
While these collective circumstances have created a system of deep barriers for rural dwellers, the 
concentration of the service sector economy in urban centers and the access to a wider range of 
infrastructure and services has enabled a part of the urban population to grow their income without 
constraint. 
 
An interesting comparison to note is the manner in which locational patterns of inequality have 
come to manifest themselves in China and India. The discussion on China indicates a concerted 
effort on the part of the government to use the opening of the economy to boost coastal provinces 
in their development. In India, however, the pervading circumstances seemed to come about much 
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more organically. The liberalization of the economy provided no safeguards, and therefore adverse 
circumstances, for a very slowly improving agricultural sector. Meanwhile the manufacturing sector, 
bogged down by a peculiar set of circumstances tied with long-standing controls on its growth, 
found it difficult to take advantage of the sudden change in the economic and political environment. 
Thus the service sector, almost as a gap-filler, came to capitalize on the increased economic freedom 
in the 1990s. Service sector industries are typically concentrated in urban areas, by nature and 
necessity. As such, the disproportionate bias towards urban growth and development, and towards 
opportunities for urban dwellers, has also been more a feature of circumstance in India. This is not 
to say that government policies have been irrelevant. Indeed the government did aim to bolster 
what they saw as the engine of Indian growth, leaving other parts of the country in relative neglect. 
 
Regardless of the reason for these emerging locational trends in opportunity, like in China, much of 
the rural population has sought to take part in the urban-led growth. Indeed over the course of the 
past two decades, there has been increased migration from rural to urban areas as well as an 
increased rate in the creation of urban centers (Krishna and Bajpai, 2011). Additionally, to elaborate 
on the importance of proximity to urban places, population data has also shown that the proportion 
of the rural population located in “umbra” villages has increased by 18% in the last decade (p. 49). 
The resultant increase in a disadvantaged urban population has in part been responsible for the 
significant rise in urban inequality in the post-reform era. As our data has shown, a large part of the 
urban population has remained stagnant or even declining in real wages. Compared with the 
exponential growth of the top quintiles of the urban population, therefore, inequality within urban 
areas is actually much more drastic than that within rural areas. For instance, the gini coefficient in 
urban areas was 0.367 in 1983, reduced to 0.357 in 1993-94, and shot up to 0.389 by 2004-05. By 
contrast, in rural areas the gini coefficient was 0.319 in 1983, down to 0.298 by 1993-94, and back 
up to 0.320 by 2004-05. In rural areas, the reforms seem only to have cemented patterns of 
inequality while in urban areas, the gap between the rich and the poor has grown much more 
substantially and rapidly (Sarkar & Mehta, 2009, 48). 
 
Another peculiarity arises in assessing the effects of education in urban and rural areas. For the 
bottom 3 or 4 quintiles, returns to education at all levels is higher for those in urban areas. This 
indicates that India’s growth has been urban-biased for households in this majority segment. But at 
the highest percentiles of the welfare distribution, the study shows that returns to every level of 
education except college were higher in rural areas. The gap between education among the urban 
and rural poor may be diminishing due to rural education programs that are creating more educated 
youth among the rural poor than the labour market can accommodate. Additionally, rural to urban 
migration of the least educated groups also contributes to the lessening disparity. (Chamarbagwala, 
2010). 
 
Krishna and Bajpai (2011) describe the urban-rural imbalance as an issue of holistic “distance,” 
having said, “distance from market, both physical and cognitive, can importantly influence 
individuals’ economic prospects” (p. 44) In an economy that became much more oriented towards 
private sector forces in the period after 1991, it follows that patterns of inequality would be shaped 
according to distance from the market. In response to the overwhelming increase in inequality that 
grew out of these circumstances, the government began in the mid-2000s to reinvest in large-scale 
development schemes meant to boost rural development. Like the Western China Initiative in China, 
programs like Bharat Nirman, the National Rural Health Mission, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, and the 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, have strived to mitigate the effects of 
liberalization and neglect in the 1990s in order to foster a more inclusive growth. These on-going 
schemes have so far been met with mixed success. While they have met with modest success in 
improving some rural indicators, they have been criticized for inefficiencies in design, including in 
service delivery, accountability, and course corrections. While these programs have all been put 
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together with the right intentions and for the right beneficiaries, they are unlikely to deliver optimal 
results unless of course they are implemented in ways that can transcend the bureaucratic 
structures that are in place and use for example ICT as a tool for improved service delivery or have 




In this paper we have argued that geographical location serves as a defining factor of inequality in 
post-reform China and India. In China, an export-led growth strategy has allowed the country to 
capitalize on a vast coastline to spur rapid economic growth. However, the effects of market reforms 
on the distribution of resources on a provincial level and a historical bias towards export-oriented 
industry, has allowed for a rapid increase in inequality in tandem with a rise in income levels.  Fiscal 
reforms in the agricultural and industrial sectors have left the inland agrarian provinces to stagnate 
while allowing coastal provinces to take advantage of industry incentives for increased production 
and growth. Similarly, loosening restrictions on the service sector have led to rapid growth in the 
richer, more developed coastal provinces where rising income levels have resulted in an increased 
demand for services. Infrastructural development has followed a similar pattern; industrial coastal 
provinces, traditionally endowed with more developed infrastructure, have been able to capitalize 
on economic growth to drive additional infrastructure investments whereas agricultural provinces 
have languished due to a lack of local resources for investment. Declining social sector investments 
in health and education have unduly burdened rural Chinese residents in the interior provinces 
whose incomes have not risen to match the increases in out-of-pocket expenditures. 
 
In India, a boom in service sector growth in the wake of liberalizing the Indian economy led to the 
disproportionate increase in the importance of urban centers as the engines of growth and the 
centers of opportunity. However this success story is set against the backdrop of a large rural 
population which, facing deteriorating circumstances due to the effects of liberalization and the lack 
of government intervention during the decade after the advent of the reforms, now lags far behind 
in growth and opportunities compared to its urban counterpart. For the most part, the reforms of 
the 1990s created a market-based system that tended to deepen existing patterns of inequality by 
enabling rapid growth in the urban-based service sector and by forcing the already declining 
agricultural industry into stagnation. Unlike the case in China, where state planning has continued to 
play a strong role in growth and development, Indian government policy, particularly in the early 
years after the crisis, served to further enable the high-performing areas while neglecting others.  
 
While location alone cannot serve to explain the rapid rise in income inequality in China, 
geographical factors underlie each of the forces which have driven the disparity.  In recent decades, 
a loosening of restrictions on migration and a concerted policy initiative aimed at rectifying 
inequities between coastal China and the western hinterland have led to improvements in income 
levels in the interior provinces, yet the overall impact on regional inequality has yet to be 
determined.  China's reform experience, a result of a concerted effort on the part of the central 
government to boost China's economic growth to the level of its East Asian neighbours, has certainly 
been successful, yet many questions remain. How can the success of the coastal provinces be 
harnessed to bring about more inclusive growth, reducing the impact of mounting regional 
inequalities? How can access to services be improved in economically and physically disconnected 
areas of the hinterland and how might this improved access lead to type of growth that would allow 
the western provinces to develop alongside the coastal areas? Does the Chinese case provide 
evidence that regional inequalities, particularly due to geographical factors, are a necessary evil of 
growth and globalization? 
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Similarly, in India, there have been positive forces towards improving the lot of rural areas. 
Government policy initiatives, while limited, do constitute large-scale attempts to disseminate hard 
and soft infrastructure resources to rural areas and have shown some level of impact in improving 
relevant social and economic indicators among this population. Additionally, the shape of the 
economy, as it arose in the wake of reforms, has also begun to change. As the government has 
poured more resources into improving agriculture while also creating policies to protect agricultural 
interests, there are signs of change for the better in the direction the industry will take in the future. 
Meanwhile, the service sector, which was previously concentrated only in urban areas, has begun to 
shift into rural areas to escape congestion and increasing prices in urban centers. As a result, 
employment opportunities have been created and return to employment in the service sector in 
rural areas has increased compared to that in urban centers, at least for the top four quintiles 
(Chamarbagwala, 2010). The dynamic changes over the last couple of decades in India have led to a 
number of questions. How can the government promote inclusive growth throughout the country? 
Can the success of the service sector be spread to provide gains for a larger share of the population? 
Can other sectors of the economy be bolstered to provide diversified employment avenues to the 
population? What lessons can India take from the growth experience of other nations, and in turn, 
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